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For Stalin, it was a last pitch to the West to
Soviet specialists working at the North Ko-
longer had any troops capable of resistance,
resolve the Korean crisis without major es-
rean enterprises,27 as well as some redun-
and that the road toward the 38th parallel
calation.28 At 9:15 p.m. (Moscow time), in
dant personnel of the Soviet organizations
from the south was wide open. Finally,
Beijing Soviet Ambassador Roshchin deliv-
in the DPRK. As the Soviet Ambassador to
Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, “im-
ered the content of the draft resolution to
the DPRK responsible for the lives of his
mediately dispatch at least five to six divi-
Zhou Enlai. At 10:45 p.m. (Moscow time),
people and anticipating the inevitability of
sions toward the 38th parallel so that the
Zhou Enlai met Roshchin again and in-
the U.S. occupation of North Korea, Shtykov
Korean comrades would have an opportu-
formed him that Mao agreed with its provi-
not unnaturally sought emergence authority
nity to regroup and form combat reserves
sions. An hour later, after learning Mao’s
to order their evacuation. But Gromyko
north of the 38th parallel under the protection
view, Stalin immediately ordered it wired to
disagreed and advised a different proce-
of the Chinese troops.” Stalin suggested,
the Soviet Representative to the United Na-
dure: In order to show the Soviets’ continu-
apparently for the first time, that the Chinese
tions at Lake Success.29
ous faith and backing for Kim Il Sung’s
troops should be designated as “volunteer”
It is well known that on October 2,
government, he recommended to Stalin that
forces. In order to entice Mao further, he
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky presented
Shtykov be allowed to repatriate the Soviet
indicated that he was ready to share overall
the Soviet draft resolution to the Political
specialists only after a specific request of
command and control over the KPA and the
Committee of the General Assembly, which
such a nature was made by the DPRK gov-
Chinese volunteer forces with the Chinese
stipulated an immediate ceasefire, with
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 100
drawal of all foreign troops, and general
plained, after “thoroughly” considering the
October 2 which was published in 1987 in an
elections in all Korea to be held under inter-
matter, many of his comrades now advo-
official Chinese document compilation and
national supervision. However, at this stage
cated a more cautious course of action.
has since been relied upon for numerous
of the war, after a miraculous landing at
Consequently, the PRC would refrain from
scholarly accounts; see the attached foot-
Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul when the
sending troops to Korea, at least for the time
note for further information.)30
KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of
being. Mao attributed this reversal to three
Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disap-
question and totally unacceptable to the West.
principal considerations. First, the Chinese
pointed, did not know whether Mao had
By now, the decision made in Washington,
army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and
given his final word or was simply for bar-
on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th
had “no confidence” it could defeat the mod-
gaining for better terms for China’s partici-
parallel, after Inch’on had become an offi-
ern American military, which could “force
pation in the war. During the day of October
cial United Nations operation.
us into retreat.” Second, Chinese interven-
5, Stalin conferred with the members of the
While waiting for Mao’s reply, on Oc-
tion in the conflict would “most likely” lead
(VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the offi-
tober 2, Stalin received information that the
to an open Sino-American war, which in
cial agenda was designated as “the Question
North Korean frontier defenses had begun to
turn could drag the USSR into the war due to
of Comrade Shtykov,” the real issue under
crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee’s
its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alli-
consideration was the nature of the Soviet
revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces
ance Treaty, “and the question would thus
national security interest in Korea and how
had pushed north beyond the parallel on the
become extremely large.” Finally, after
to protect it on the ground. All Politburo
east coast road heading towards Kosong. He
decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the
members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S.
sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev
Korean conflict to confront a powerful
confrontation in Korea should be avoided at
in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating
American adversary would provoke wide-
all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon
his earlier directive to his chief military
spread domestic resentment within the PRC
North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev
representative in Korea to do his utmost to
toward the newly-established People’s Gov-
recalls that “When the threat [after Inch’on]
bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the
ernment, and wreck the leadership’s plan for
emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea
south back into the north, and to hold the
peaceful reconstruction.
that North Korea would be annihilated, and
frontline along the 38th parallel.
Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded,
that the Americans would reach our border.
In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis
it was necessary to “show patience now,”
I remember quite well that in connection
was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou’s
focus on building military strength for a
with the exchange of opinions on the Korean
warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing
possible later conflict, and in the meantime
question, Stalin said: ‘So what? Let the
had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier;
accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the
United States of America be our neighbors
Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military
North Koreans “change the form of the
in the Far East. They will come there, but we
assistance; and, finally, Stalin was person-
struggle to partisan war.” Mao concluded
shall not fight them now. We are not ready
ally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Con-
his message by noting that this decision was
to fight.’”31 The upshot of the Politburo
sequently, that day Mao convened the first [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]