[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

the post-Cold War order. It had its oil wealth to rely on for domestic as well as
international purposes; at least temporarily, however, the oil prices were
decreasing.
Syria
Syria, with roughly 19 million people and very modest oil reserves, was as
deeply affected by the Soviet disintegration as Iraq, although differently. The
economy was generally poor, and the military depended on advisors, support
and equipment from the Soviet Union. Syria began to lose superpower support
in the late 1980s during the political re-orientation undertaken by Mikhail Gor-
bachev. Syria had thus far officially aimed to achieve strategic parity with Israel
with Soviet aid, but was told by the USSR that this was no longer a realistic
option (Karsh 1993), as the economic and military support from the Soviet
Union was reduced. The loss of the Soviet alignment was of great significance,
and a Syrian diplomat put it this way:  we regret the Soviet collapse more than
the Russians do .7
Syria was also in trouble regionally. Damascus was at odds with Iraq to the
East; to its West it was engaged in the Lebanese civil war and later entangled in
Lebanese politics (while the civil war ended after agreement on the Ta if
Accords of October 1989, Syria maintained its presence); and it had not made
peace with Israel to the South, struggling instead to re-gain the Golan Heights,
which Israel had occupied since the 1967 War. Internationally, Syria s relations
with the US were hampered by American accusations of Syrian support for
international terrorism, by Syrian hostility towards Israel, and by Syrian inter-
vention in Lebanese affairs.
In short, Syria s prospects for coping well with the competitive conditions of
the new world order were unfavourable: like Iraq and Libya, its institutional
economic basis was poor; unlike Iraq and Libya, however, Syria did not possess
vast oil reserves.
The Middle East 109
The model and the MENA region: theoretical expectations
A range of security strategies was available to the losers. As seen in Chapter 2,
we have divided the strategies available into four broad types for analytical
reasons: soft and hard bandwagoning and soft and hard balancing.8 We are
aware that states do not necessarily pursue coherent strategies and possibly
choose to mix elements from different strategies. Consequently, we consider the
strategies as bunches of strategic elements and add up the use of elements and
make a judgement as to which strategies dominated.
We argued in Chapter 2 that the structural incentives  our condition variable 
relating to a unipolar distribution of power and the specific alliance dynamics are
indeterminate, but that hard balancing is extremely costly in the case of unipolar-
ity. Conversely, bandwagoning strategies offer short-term benefits and protection
while at the same time involving long-term dangers such as subjugation. The
MENA states were thus facing a difficult dilemma. Our independent variable, rela-
tive security, leads us to expect balancing behaviour, while our intervening vari-
able, relative ideology leads us to expect hard balancing by the three states.
According to Chapter 2, a high level of relative security provides bandwagoning
incentives, while a low level disposes for balancing. Ideological distance arguably
amplifies the incentive to pursue either hard or soft strategies. Considerable ideo-
logical distance coupled with low relative security favours the choice of hard bal-
ancing strategies over soft strategies, while a short ideological distance coupled
with high relative security favours hard bandwagoning over soft bandwagoning.
The three case countries could all be described as being caught in a cross-fire
of incentives when having to adapt to the unipolar world order. Their loss and
lack of relative power created a dilemma. Basically, they had a strong incentive
to balance the US and counter the effects of the emerging world order, but their
weakness also appeared to produce incentives for the case countries to pursue
bandwagoning strategies, as it would be costly to balance the US and the bene-
fits would be doubtful.
However, our independent variable  relative security  points to a balanc-
ing incentive. Their exposure to a low degree of relative security was favour-
ing the choice of balancing strategies. A corresponding relatively high
probability of conflict assumingly matches the high costs of balancing and
may appear worthwhile. The unipole may lower the probability of conflict by
means of an alignment or other forms of close cooperation or increase the
probability in the event of hostility. An important dimension in this regard is
thus the role played by the unipole. The unipole may lower the probability of
conflict by guarding the security of a state or a group of states, thus enhancing
the incentive to bandwagon, or it may increase the probability of conflict,
which in turn enhances the balancing incentive. The unipole s commitment to
a state or group of states is therefore important. In 1989 90, American engage-
ment in the MENA region was limited, owing to a preoccupation with the
developments in the collapsing Soviet Union (Hansen 2000a), which left the
MENA states with a considerable room for manoeuvre when choosing
110 The Middle East
strategies. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US increased
its presence in the region considerably (Cordesman 1997) and engaged in the
peace process until the mid-1990s. During the second half of the 1990s, the
US granted priority to other issues, once again opening the door for the
MENA states room for manoeuvre regarding their security strategies. Follow-
ing 9/11, the US strategic interest and engagement in the region dramatically
increased, providing some states with enhanced opportunities to bandwagon
and a few with enhanced incentives to balance; and several states to reconsider
their options.
Iraq and Syria were facing a relatively high probability of conflict. In the case
of Syria, the degree of relative security was further challenged by the fact that
Syria found itself at odds with the US. Iraq was initially relatively at ease with
the US, though this already changed to a course of confrontation in 1990. Libya
was also facing a high probability of conflict regionally, although not as high as
Iraq and Syria. Like Syria and Iraq, however, Libya was at odds with the sole
remaining superpower, the US. The low degree of relative security in the case
countries and the absence of alternative security arrangements thus provided
them with incentives to pursue balancing strategies.
The value on our intervening variable, ideological distance to the US and the
current unipolar world order, encouraged hard balancing strategies because of dis-
agreement on core issues and due to the risk of being forced to surrender core
values. In Chapter 1 we pointed out a number of general ideological features of the
US political project and the current world order: promotion of democracy, human
rights, market economy and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs). While Iraq, Libya and Syria are certainly very different societies, they [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]